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AT WORK WHILE "UNDER THE INFLUENCE":
THE EMPLOYER'S RESPONSE TO A
HAZARDOUS CONDITION
I. INTRODUCTION
The magnitude of drug and alcohol abuse in society1 has
considerable implications upon both work place safety and ef-
ficiency.2 The costs associated with drug and alcohol abuse in
the work force3 have resulted in the widespread adoption of
1. Statements on Drug/Alcohol Abuse in the Workplace Before House Labor Sub-
comm. on Health and Safety, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 234, at D-1 (Dec. 31, 1985) (a survey conducted by the National Institute
on Drug Abuse reports that "20 million Americans are currently using marijuana/hash-
ish ... ; 4 million Americans are using cocaine; 2 million Americans are currently using
other stimulants; over 1 million Americans are using sedatives without a prescription;
and 100 million Americans are using alcohol") (statement of Elaine M. Johnson, Acting
Deputy Director, National Institute on Drug Abuse).
2. A 1982 Industry Week study of a dozen major American corporations has re-
vealed that a drug impaired employee "is 3.6 times as likely to be involved in an acci-
dent; has 2.5 times as many absences lasting eight days or longer; receives 3 times the
average level of sick benefits; is 5 times as likely to file a worker's compensation claim,
and functions at about 67% of the work potential." Id. at D-3 (statement of J. Ronald
Blount, Associated General Contractors of America).
3. A study conducted by the Employee Assistance Society of North America indi-
cates that, "lost productivity due to alcohol abuse costs the United States $30.1 billion a
year, while the cost for drug abuse is $8.3 billion." From Baseball Diamond to Shop
Floor, Employers Battling Alcohol/Drug Abuse, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 211, at C-
1 (Oct. 31, 1985).
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programs to detect substance abuse in both the public4 and
private sectors.5
The first part of this Comment will address issues raised
regarding the validity of the means chosen by the employer
for the detection of intoxication or the use of illicit substances
where challenged by constitutional and common law rights of
privacy. The article will next consider the adoption and appli-
cation of plant rules and programs in the context of a collec-
tively-bargained agreement. Finally, there will be a discussion
of the constraints imposed by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
and the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act upon an employer's
decision to terminate the employment of a known alcohol or
drug abuser, and a brief survey of an employer's exposure to
liability upon a decision to retain a substance-impaired
employee.
II. DETECTION OF DRUG OR ALCOHOL IMPAIRMENT
A. Constraints
1. Public Sector
In the context of public sector employment, the adminis-
tration of programs implemented for the purpose of detecting
drug or alcohol abuse is subject to challenge under the fourth
4. On September 15, 1986, President Reagan signed an executive order requiring
mandatory drug testing for workers in "sensitive" positions and providing for testing of
employees in non-sensitive positions where: (1) there is a reasonable suspicion that the
employee uses illegal drugs; (2) as part of an investigation of an accident or unsafe
practice; or (3) as follow-up to counseling or rehabilitation through an Employee
Assistance Program. Exec. Order No. 12564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32889 (1986); see also Tur-
ner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3294 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (rule
requiring police officers suspected of drug use to undergo drug testing found constitu-
tional; refusal to undergo testing, or a positive test, results in discharge); Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n v. Dole, No. 85-2891 (9th Cir. 1986) discussed in DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 5, at A-7 (Jan. 8, 1986) (The implementation of a drug and alcohol testing
program announced by the Department of Transportation to cover railroad employees
was stayed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The nation-
wide program would require pre-employment drug screening and toxicological testing
of employees where there is probable cause to suspect impairment by drugs or alcohol.);
see also Milwaukee J., Mar. 6, 1986 (Metro), at 1, col. 2 (federal employees interviewed
in Wisconsin unanimously agreed that they would submit to drug testing if it becomes a
requirement for having a government job).
5. Marcotte, Drugs at Work, 72 A.B.A. J. (Mar. 1, 1986) ("As many as 25 percent
of the major corporations in the United States now engage in drug screening before
hiring new employees. .. ").
1986]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
amendment.6 It has not been until recently that the question
of the application of the constitutional "search and seizure"
proscription has been evaluated in the employment arena;
however, the constitutionality of blood and alcohol testing has
been delineated with respect to the procurement of evidence in
charges of driving while under the influence of an intoxicating
liquor.7
In Schmerber v. California,8 the Supreme Court addressed,
for the first time, the issue of whether the compulsory admin-
istration of blood tests violated the search and seizure provi-
sions of the fourth amendment. The fourth amendment
challenge in Schmerber involved a blood test, taken at the di-
rection of a police officer, after the petitioner had been
charged with the criminal offense of driving an automobile
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The first step
in the Court's analysis was to determine if the compulsory
blood test involved an intrusion within the scope of the fourth
amendment. Finding that "[s]uch testing procedures plainly
constitute searches of 'persons,' and depend antecedently
upon seizures of 'persons,' " the Court set forth the founda-
tion of the second tier of its analysis by stating that "the
Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not
against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are
not justified under the circumstances, or which are made in an
improper manner."1 Therefore, the Court's finding that
blood testing constituted a search within the meaning of the
fourth amendment was not determinative of whether the test-
ing was violative of the fourth amendment; rather, an individ-
ual's fourth amendment protection was held to be impinged
only where the search was "not justified under the
circumstances."
6. The fourth amendment provides, in relevant part, for "[t]he right of people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Davis v. District of Co-
lumbia, 247 A.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1968); State v. Locke, 418 A.2d 843 (R.I. 1980).
8. 384 U.S. 757. For an analysis of Schmerber and a discussion of evidence pro-
cured by search, see Comment, Analyzing the Reasonableness of Bodily Intrusions, 68
MARQ. L. REV. 130 (1984).
9. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767.
10. Id. at 768.
[Vol. 70:88
AT WORK WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE
The Court's holding that the warrantless blood testing at
issue was justified, and thus not violative of the petitioner's
fourth amendment protection, was predicated upon the "clear
indication that evidence would be found,"'1 that a delay in
procuring a warrant could result in "the destruction of evi-
dence,"" and, that the test was performed in a reasonable
manner.1 3 In the case of searches of government employees,
an additional exception to the warrant requirement has
emerged.4
While the Schmerber case is arguably distinguishable from
testing in the employment context since evidence obtained by
an employer would not be used in a criminal investigation, the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
rejected such a distinction in Shoemaker v. Handel,5 stating
that, "[a]l of us are protected by the Fourth Amendment all
of the time, not just when the state suspects us of criminal
conduct." 16 Not only was the Schmerber decision held to be
applicable to tests administered by a public employer, but the
decision which had found blood tests to constitute searches
was extended in Shoemaker to include breathalyzer and
urinalysis as well.1 7
In Shoemaker, jockeys challenged the constitutionality of
a regulation promulgated by the New Jersey Racing Commis-
sion which provided for the random testing of jockeys and dis-
ciplinary action in the event of positive results. The
legitimacy of warrantless testing was analyzed by means of a
11. Id. at 770. "[H]uman dignity and privacy which the fourth amendment pro-
tects forbid any intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained."
Id.
12. Id. (citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).
13. Id. at 771. The fact that the test was conducted in a hospital was held to indi-
cate that it was conducted in a "reasonable manner." Id. at 771-72.
14. Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 489 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
15. 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1985).
16. Id. at 1098 (citing McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1126 (S.D. Iowa
1985)). But see United States v. Kahan, 350 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 479 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 415 U.S. 239 (1974).
17. "Breathalyzer and urine searches implicate the interests in human dignity and
privacy found to be at stake in Schmerber." Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp at 1098; see also
Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976) (urinalysis found to constitute search within the meaning
of the fourth amendment).
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two-prong "reasonableness test":18 (1) whether the govern-
ment's interest in conducting a search outweighed a "legiti-
mate expectation" of privacy, 19 and (2) if the administration
of the tests was reasonable.2 °
With respect to the first prong of the "reasonableness
test," the court found the government interest in "maintaining
the integrity of the racing industry and the safety of the
sport"'" outweighed the jockeys' legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy. The issue more critical to the development of drug and
alcohol detection in the work place was the court's finding
with respect to the second prong of the test involving the ad-
ministration of the test on a random basis. While restating the
principle that "some quantum of individualized suspicion"22 is
usually requisite to a constitutional search, the court found
that the random testing procedure was reasonable. The
court's basis for upholding a testing procedure in which indi-
viduals tested were chosen by drawing names from an envel-
ope was primarily in its finding of the relatively low degree of
intrusiveness involved in breathalyzer tests and urinalysis2 3 as
compared with the state's need for conducting such tests in
the absence of any individualized suspicion.24
18. Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1098. The court in Chenkin v. Bellevue Hosp.
Center, N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 479 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) stated: "It
is axiomatic that the fourth amendment forbids only those warrantless searches deemed
'unreasonable.'" Id. at 213.
19. The foundation for the court's analysis was the test enunciated by Justice
Harlan in his concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which set forth
a two-prong analysis in determining whether an expectation of privacy is legitimate: (1)
if there is an actual expectation of privacy; and (2) if society is prepared to recognize
that interest as reasonable. Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1098 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at
361).
20. Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1100.
21. Id.
22. Id. (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976)).
23. The Court compared the intrusiveness of breathalyzer and urine tests to body
cavity and strip searches which are considered the most intrusive of searches. Shoe-
maker, 619 F. Supp. at 1101.
24. Three reasons were delineated as providing justification for testing absent any
suspicion:
(1) The fact that the horse racing industry had been subject to "pervasive and
continuous regulation"; (2) licensure requirements provided ample notice of the
regulations; and (3) the vital interest of the state in ensuring that races are safely
run.
Id. at 1102.
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The court's decision in Shoemaker was issued only one
year after the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Mc-
Donell v. Hunter25 had affirmed the decision of a district
court2 6 in enjoining strip searches, blood tests, and urinalysis
unless the searching officials had a "reasonable suspicion" that
the employee was smuggling drugs or under the influence of
drugs or alcohol. The detection program at issue in McDonell
provided for the testing of employees of a state correctional
institution absent any suspicion to warrant the investigation
and regardless of whether a consent form had been signed.27
The court in Shoemaker noted and distinguished McDonell
primarily on the basis of the unique nature of the racing in-
dustry which required, and historically had been subject to,
pervasive regulation.28 Despite the court's effort to provide a
basis for the inconsistency among the circuits regarding the
necessity of probable cause in conducting a search, the court's
emphasis upon the particular nature of the employment as a
basis to uphold testing absent a reasonable suspicion has not
been reflected in other decisions.29
For example, in Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police,30 an
order issued by the municipal police department of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, providing that any member of the depart-
ment could be ordered to submit to urinalysis upon
"suspicion" of drug abuse, was interpreted to require a "rea-
25. 746 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1984).
26. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
27. One employee, McDonell, who had signed a consent form, had been fired be-
cause he had refused to take a urinalysis test after prison officials asked him to take the
test due to information they allegedly received regarding his involvement in drug traf-
ficking. Two other employees were told they would be compelled to submit to testing
after they refused to sign consent forms. McDonell, 746 F.2d at 786. In Shoemaker, the
court distinguished the inadequacy of the consent in McDonell from the licensure re-
quirements of jockeys. 619 F. Supp. at 1102.
28. See supra note 24.
29. It is interesting to note that the policy considerations which prompted the court
in Shoemaker to discard the requirement of a reasonable suspicion prior to testing were
present in City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985),
wherein the court, citing McDonell, found the testing of police and fire department
employees unconstitutional absent a "reasonable suspicion" of usage. Id. at 1324.
Clearly the government interest in providing a drug and alcohol free police and fire
department is at least as strong as is the interest as applied to horse racing. Id. at 1324.
Cf supra note 24 and accompanying text.
30. 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3294 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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sonable, objective basis to suspect that a urinalysis"3 1 would
produce evidence of illegal drug use. The decision to require a
reasonable suspicion was reached despite the court's recogni-
tion of the public interest in ensuring a narcotic-free police
force.32 Thus, while it has been uniformly accepted that the
government may impose reasonable restrictions upon employ-
ment,33 including regulations requiring drug and alcohol test-
ing, whether a particular testing program is "reasonable" will
depend upon the court's balancing of the individual privacy
claim against the government's asserted interest.34
2. Private Sector
It is well established that the fourth amendment protection
against unreasonable search and seizure applies only against
the state.35  Therefore, as contrasted with the public sector,
private employers are not limited by the constitutional con-
straints discussed above. 36  Furthermore, in the absence of a
showing that a private employer is "government motivated,"
evidence procured as a result of a search of an employee or his
property is admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings.37
For example, in United States v. Bloom, 38 evidence discovered
31. Id. at 3296-97.
32. Id. at 3296 ("[G]iven the nature of the [police] work and the fact that not only
his life, but lives of the public rest upon his alertness, the necessity of rational action and
a clear head unbefuddled by narcotics becomes self-evident.").
33. See, e.g., Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264,
1267 (7th Cir. 1976); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985)
("[T]he government has the same right as any private employer to oversee its employees
and investigate potential misconduct relevant to the employee's performance of his du-
ties."). Id. at 491.
34. See City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. at 489.
35. See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). A district court in
Hoagburg v. Harrah's Marina Hotel, 585 F. Supp. 1167 (D.N.J. 1984), rejected a first
amendment free speech claim against a casino holding that, "[a]s a general principle,
the federal constitutional guarantees of personal rights are enforceable as against federal
or state governments only, and not as against private individuals." Id. at 1171 (empha-
sis in original); see generally Lehr & Middlebrooks, Work-Place Privacy Issues and Em-
ployer Screening Policies, 11 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS L.J. 407, 412 (1985).
36. See, e.g., Heiskala v. Johnson Center Fed. Credit Union, 474 F. Supp. 448, 450
(S.D. Tex. 1979).
37. See, e.g., State v. Stevens, 123 Wis. 2d 303, 367 N.W.2d 788 (1985) (evidence
procured by a garbage collector entering defendant's locked garage subject to fourth
amendment constraints wherein the garbage collector had become an agent of the gov-
ernment by previously agreeing to give defendant's garbage to a deputy sheriff).
38. 450 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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as a result of an employer's search of former employees' desks
was admissible in proceedings before the Securities Exchange
Commission. Similarly, in State v. Bembenek,39 the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals held that evidence in a criminal proceeding
was properly admitted where it had been discovered by a uni-
versity safety officer searching a purse in the defendant's
locker.4° Although state constitutions may concurrently pro-
vide protection against unreasonable search and seizures, such
provisions are generally similarly limited to protection against
government agents.41
Despite the relative certainty which exists with respect to
the state action requirement of a constitutional claim 42 where
there is a collective bargaining agreement providing for dis-
charge only for cause, fourth amendment principles may be
substantively recognized by the arbitrator in determining the
propriety of a discharge where the "cause" was based upon
evidence procured by a "search" or "seizure. ' 43
Illustrative of the uncertainty which has existed with re-
spect to the application of the fourth amendment to searches
conducted by a private employer is the arbitrator's discussion
in Smith's Food King."4 The grievant in Smith's Food King
39. 111 Wis. 2d 617, 331 N.W.2d 616 (1983).
40. The rationale of the court was set forth as follows:
It is a long-established rule that the constitutional guarantee against unlawful
searches and seizures applies only to actions of government agents and not pri-
vate individuals. A private search is beyond the reach of the exclusionary rule.
One of the reasons for the exclusionary rule is to deter the police from illegal
searches by denying them convictions based on the fruits of illegal searches. The
policy behind not applying the exclusionary rule in private searches is that pri-
vate individuals will not be so deterred, because they have less knowledge of
criminal procedure and are not interested in getting convictions.
Id. at 631-32, 331 N.W.2d at 624 (citations omitted).
41. See Hoagburg v. Harrah's Marina Hotel, 585 F. Supp. 1167 (D.N.J. 1984);
State v. Jenkins, 80 Wis. 2d 426, 259 N.W.2d 109 (1977). But see Montana Human
Rights Div. v. City of Billings, 199 Mont. 434, 649 P.2d 1283 (1982) (right to privacy
set forth in Montana Constitution extends to protect against private individuals).
42. Lugar v. Edmundson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
43. Dow Chem. Co., 65 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1295 (1976) (Lipson, Arb.) (rights of
privacy and personal dignity to be given consideration by labor arbitrators with respect
to employer conducted searches); Aldens, Inc., 58 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1213 (1972)
(McGury, Arb.) (exclusionary rule applies to suppress evidence of goods stolen by em-
ployee from employer where evidence is the result of an improper search conducted off
company premises); see also Gem City Chem., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1023 (1986)
(Warns, Arb.) (testing without probable cause constitutes "invasion of privacy").
44. 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 619 (1976) (Ross, Arb.).
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contended that a bodily search conducted by the employer's
security guard violated his constitutional right of protection
against unreasonable search and seizure. While stating that
the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and
seizure did not apply in the context of private employment,
the arbitrator nevertheless implied as a condition to the ad-
mission of evidence procured by a search a "reasonable pro-
tection" of an employee's right to privacy.45
Arbitration decisions upholding the use of search tech-
niques are typically buttressed with language indicating a rec-
ognition of fourth amendment rights against searches in the
private sector by predicating the legitimacy of a search with a
finding of the existence of an employer's "suspicion. '4 6 Re-
cently, however, the arbitrator in Shell Oil Company47 explic-
itly upheld the use of a "spot-check" search, stating, "[t]he
ramifications of the use of drugs in the work force go far be-
yond economics. More importantly, they impact the safety of
all employees .... To control such drug usage in the work-
place, a search policy is patently necessary. '48 It is neverthe-
less important to note that the arbitrator's apparent broad-
based recognition of the need and legitimacy of random em-
ployee searches was not necessary to his decision. Although
the employer's search policy included the right to search
packages, lunch boxes, and vehicles on company premises
without a "reasonable suspicion" 49 of possession or use, the
employer did have reason to suspect the possession of illicit
substances with respect to the grievant.50 Thus, it is not cer-
45. Id. at 625. (although the evidence obtained from the search was admitted in
the proceeding, the grievant was reinstated upon the arbitrator's finding of disparate
treatment).
46. See, e.g., Prestige Stamping Co., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 163 (1980) (Keefe, Arb.).
47. 84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 562 (1985) (Milentz, Arb.).
48. Id. at 565.
49. The employer's policy was contained in the employee handbook and explained
in a company newsletter as follows: "The Company continues to reserve the right to
carry out reasonable searches of all individuals and their personal effects (including
vehicles) on all Company property. Such searches may be conducted by the Company
without prior announcement of such times and locations as deemed appropriate by the
Company." Id. at 563 (quoting Shell Oil Co. Newsletter (Dec. 28, 1982)) (emphasis
added).
50. A security guard employed by the company had observed "roaches" and a
"roach clip" in the grievant's car prior to the search. Id. at 564.
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tain that the arbitrator would have upheld the policy were it
enforced absent a "suspicion" justifying the search.
Several months after the decision in Shell Oil Company
was rendered, the arbitrator in Rust Engineering Company51
expressly rejected fourth amendment protection against pri-
vate action. In Rust Engineering Company, the grievant's
wallet was discovered to contain marijuana by a supervisor
who had found the wallet and looked through its contents to
identify the owner. The employee was discharged for viola-
tion of a plant rule prohibiting the possession of narcotics or
alcohol on company premises. Upholding the discharge, the
arbitrator recognized that some arbitrators had applied consti-
tutional rights in the context of labor arbitration; nevertheless,
the arbitrator correctly continued, stating "[t]he fact remains,
however, that the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States protects against government, not private,
action."52
Whether the Shell Oil and Rust Engineering decisions will
be recognized by arbitrators in future decisions is uncertain.
However, even if arbitrators extend the fourth amendment
protection to searches conducted by employers in the private
sector, a broad interpretation of the "reasonable suspicion"
requirement 53 may nevertheless result in a wide latitude of cir-
cumstances in which random searches may be justified.
B. Common Law Right to Privacy
A common law right to privacy, described generally as a
"right to be let alone,"' 54 is set forth in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts.5 5 Pertinent to this discussion of employer test-
ing and other forms of searches to be used in the detection of
drugs and alcohol use or possession is section 652B, which
51. 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 407 (1985) (Whyte, Arb.).
52. Id. at 410.
53. See, e.g., Boone Energy, 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 233, 236 (1985) (O'Connell, Arb.)
(employer's suspicion of entire workforce justified where any employee is found under
the influence of a controlled substance).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A comment a (1977).
55. Id. at § 652A. The Restatement describes four forms of tortious invasions of
another's privacy: (1) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (2) appro-
priation of other's name or likeness; (3) unreasonable publicity given to the other's pri-
vate life; and (4) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the
public. Id. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 807-09 (1971).
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describes an invasion of privacy categorized as an "intrusion
upon seclusion."'5 6 This particular form of a tortious interfer-
ence with another's privacy is described as follows:
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise,
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private af-
fairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for inva-
sion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person.
57
In those states which recognize the tort of intrusion upon
another's seclusion, a protection analogous to the search and
seizure provision of the Constitution is provided against the
acts of private individuals. 8 With respect to labor relations,
the common law or statutory right to privacy clearly raises
considerations upon the means adopted by employers to de-
tect drugs or alcohol.
In Kansas, an employee challenged his employer's policy
of randomly searching employee vehicles prior to their exit
from company property.59 Since the Kansas Supreme Court
had previously recognized the Restatement version of the tort
of intrusion upon seclusion,60 the employee, who was termi-
nated for refusal to comply with the policy, asserted a cause of
action for "invasion of privacy and for reckless, wanton disre-
gard of [the] right to be let alone. ' 61 The court dismissed the
privacy claim on the ground that the employee's refusal to
allow the search had "successfully thwarted the commission
of the alleged tort"62 and therefore did not resolve the issue of
whether a completed search constitutes a tortious intrusion.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
57. Id. The comments accompanying this section indicate the particular appropri-
ateness of this section to privacy interests in an employment context. In particular,
comment b states that an invasion may occur by an "investigation or examination into
[the plaintiff's] private concerns, as by opening his private and personal mail, searching
his safe or wallet ..... Id.
58. Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652, 667 (E.D. Pa. 1978). The
court held that the tort of intrusion was the appropriate analogy to a civil rights claim
based on unlawful searches of property, but stated that false imprisonment was the
appropriate tort with respect to seizures of persons. Id. at 667 n. 12.
59. Gretencord v. Ford Motor Co., 538 F. Supp. 331 (D. Kan. 1982).
60. Froelich v. Adair, 213 Kan. 357, 516 P.2d 993 (1973).
61. Gretencord, 538 F. Supp. at 333. The employee also raised claims of false im-
prisonment and outrageous conduct which will not be discussed in this Comment. Id.
at 333-34.
62. Id.
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Although there has not yet developed a clear delineation
as to the scope of an employee's reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the context of tortious interference, liability has been
imposed where a corporate officer opened and read mail ad-
dressed to another employee,63 and where employees have en-
tered the home of a fellow employee uninvited.' In the latter
instance, the plaintiff-employee was discharged as a result of
information conveyed to an employer of plaintiff's intoxica-
tion discovered when fellow employees entered the plaintiff's
trailer via the aid of a locksmith. Finding that the entrance
violated plaintiff's right to privacy, the Louisiana court distin-
guished between an "actual" uncompensable, single, uninvited
entry into another's home and the "actionable" intrusion at
issue.65 The court's finding that the intrusion was "unreason-
able," and therefore "actionable," was primarily based upon
its finding that the entrance was motivated by a desire to
"prove [the employee's] unworthiness as a supervisory
employee. '66
In addition to potentially limiting the manner by which an
employer may lawfully test or search employees, privacy
claims have been asserted with respect to the required disclo-
sure of information.67 However, in the absence of publication,
the required disclosure of personal information is not unrea-
sonably intrusive where there exist valid business interests to
support the disclosure. 68 For example, in Spencer v. General
Telephone Company,69 a federal district court, applying Penn-
sylvania law, recognized the state's adoption of the Restate-
ment privacy tort, but nevertheless rejected an employee's
claim that an information sheet requiring a security investiga-
tion constituted a tortious intrusion.70  Rather, the court
stated that subjective offense was insufficient and held that
"[s]uch a request cannot compare to the surreptitious investi-
63. Vernars v. Young, 539 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1976).
64. Love v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 263 So. 2d 460 (La. Ct. App. 1972).
65. Id. at 465-66.
66. Id. at 466.
67. See, e.g., Bratt v. International Business Machs. Corp., 392 Mass. 508, 467
N.E.2d 126 (1984).
68. Id. at 135-36; see also Cort v. Bristol-Meyers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 431 N.E.2d
908 (1982).
69. 551 F. Supp. 896 (M.D. Pa. 1982).
70. Id. at 899.
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gations or activities envisioned by the Restatement."' 7 1 While
the latter case seems to indicate the necessity of an element of
"surreptition" in a case where requested information is not
acquired, an Alabama court rejected such an argument in
Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services.72 Although the con-
duct complained of in Phillips was considerably more egre-
gious than requests which would occur in the course of an
employer's questioning of substance use or possession, 73 it is
significant to note that the court, in finding that intrusive in-
terrogation constituted a tortious interference, held that liabil-
ity could be imposed despite the absence of any physical
intrusion analogous to a trespass.74
As discussed above, an employer who employs tests, con-
ducts searches or questions an employee in a manner which
intrudes upon a "reasonable expectation of privacy" may be
liable in states recognizing the tort of intrusion upon seclu-
sion. Furthermore, such liability may not be predicated upon
the intrusion occurring in a private place, nor upon the
trespassory nature of an act.7 5 Against the flexible elements
comprising the Restatement privacy tort, Wisconsin has
adopted a more restrictive recognition of the right to pri-
vacy.76 Wisconsin Statute section 895.50 recognizes a right to
privacy for which injunctive relief and compensatory damages
are provided:77 "Intrusion upon the privacy of another of a
nature highly offensive to a reasonable person, in a place that
a reasonable person would consider private or in a manner
which is actionable for trespass. 78
Since section 895.50(2)(a) has not yet been interpreted by
Wisconsin courtS, 79 it is not apparent under which circum-
71. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B comment d).
72. 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 1983).
73. The claim in Phillips involved sexual demands which occurred prior to plain-
tiff's discharge. Id.
74. Id. at 711.
75. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B comment c.
76. Wis. STAT. § 895.50(2)(a) (1983-84).
77. WIS. STAT. § 895.50(l)(a), (b). Attorney fees are provided as well. Wis. STAT.
§ 895.50(2)(c). In addition the court may assess attorney fees against the plaintiff if the
court finds the action to be frivolous. Wis. STAT. § 895.50(6)(a), (b).
78. Wis. STAT. § 895.50(2)(a).
79. Although Wis. STAT. § 895.50(2)(a) has not been the subject of litigation, dicta
in Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979) indicates
that a claim which was denied in Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925
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stances, if at all, a place of employment will be considered
"private." If it were held that a reasonable person would in
no instance consider a work environment "private," testing or
search policies would not be violative under the trespassory
element of the statute unless: (1) a physical intrusion actually
occurred; and (2) the employee had not consented to the
search.
III. "JUST CAUSE" FOR DISCHARGE?
Generally, upon discovery that an employee has possessed
or used alcohol or drugs at work, private employers80 would
be free to discharge an employee at will unless: (1) rules set-
ting forth the policy and company disciplinary procedure are
found to constitute an employment contract modifying the at-
will relationship;81 or (2) discharge would violate a duty im-
posed by statute.8 2 However, in the context of a collectively-
bargained agreement which provides for discharge only for
"just cause," questions will ordinarily arise in arbitration8 3 re-
garding both the propriety of a plant's illicit substance rule
and its enforcement.84
(1956), involving a tavern keeper photographing a woman in a restroom while using the
facilities would be actionable under the statute. Hirsch, 90 Wis. 2d at 396, 280 N.W.2d
at 137.
80. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 63.43 (1983-84) (discharge of municipal employee in city
of over 150,000 only for "just cause"); see also Wis. STAT. § 63.10 (1983-84) (discharge
of civil service employee in county of over 500,000 only where officer believes employee
has "acted in such a manner as to show him to be incompetent to perform his duties or
to have merited demotion or dismissal"). Unlike an at-will employee, a public employee
is entitled to due process with respect to his or her discharge. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).
81. See Ferraro v. Koelsch, 124 Wis. 2d 154, 368 N.W.2d 666 (1985) (where an
employee handbook constitutes an express contract in which a promise of employment
is exchanged for a promise to continue employment on express conditions, the employ-
ment-at-will relationship is modified). But see Rouse v. People's Natural Gas Co., 119
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2220 (D. Kan. 1985) (where employment manual not bargained for,
the unilateral expression of a company policy is not binding on the employer).
82. See infra Section IV.
83. A court has discretion to determine if an employee is required to exhaust con-
tractual grievance-arbitration procedures prior to bringing a court action under § 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act, 28 U.S.C. § 185(a). See, e.g., Proffitt v. J.I. Case
Co., 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2250 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (exhaustion required); Price v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 20 (D. Mass. 1984) (exhaustion required).
84. See generally T. DENENBERG, ALCOHOL AND DRUGS, ISSUES IN THE vORK-
PLACE (1983). This Comment will not discuss the relative merits of different testing
procedures. Regardless of which testing procedure is instituted, it is apparent that
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In the event that a grievance is filed by an employee whose
discharge is covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the
burden of proof required to show "just cause" may vary with
the arbitrator. 85 Where the discharge is the result of the pos-
session or use of illicit substances, some arbitrators may re-
quire proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the theory that the
extraordinary burden is justified where the discharge is the re-
sult of "criminal or moral turpitude. ' 86  Other arbitrators
have stated that the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard
does not apply in the context of arbitration. 87
A. Implementation of Plant Rules
In the event that management is party to a collective bar-
gaining agreement and adopts a testing or search program, ad-
ditional questions arise concerning the employer's duty to
bargain about the implementation of the program.88 Whether
an employer's unilateral implementation of alcohol or drug
programs is violative of section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA),89 which imposes a duty upon the em-
ployer to bargain over conditions of employment, 90 may ulti-
mately depend upon the scope of management rights reserved
in a collective bargaining agreement.
proof of drug impairment will require the establishment of chain-of-possession proce-
dures and documentation. Failure to follow chain-of-possession procedures may result
in an arbitrator refusing to uphold a discharge based on the laboratory results at issue.
See, e.g., Pacific Motor Trucking, 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 497 (1986) (D'Spain, Arb.). For
a discussion of problems associated with testing for cannabinoids, see Georgia-Pacific
Corp., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 411 (1985) (Clarke, Arb.); see also Alcohol & Drugs in The
Workplace: Costs, Controls, and Controversies, BNA SPECIAL REPORT 27-38 (1986)
(general discussion of testing procedures).
85. Although the arbitrator will generally have flexibility in the determination of
the burden of proof to be applied, where the burden is provided in the collective bar-
gaining agreement, that provision will control. United States Gov't Printing Office, 82
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 57, 61 (1983) (Feldesman, Arb.).
86. Associated Grocers of Colo. Inc., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 974, 977 (1983) (Smith,
Arb.); see also Texas Util. Generating Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 6, 12 (1983) (Edes,
Arb.).
87. Hussman Refrigerator Co., 82 Lab. Arb. 558 (1984) (Mikrut, Jr., Arb.).
88. See, e.g., Milwaukee J., Mar. 11, 1986, § 3 (Business) at 3 (National Football
League Commissioner, Pete Rozelle, stated that if the league players' union doesn't
agree to his random drug testing program, he will unilaterally implement the program).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
90. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
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In a dispute analogous to that which might arise under
section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, a United States district court 91
recently found that a railway company's unilateral implemen-
tation of a drug surveillance and search program violated sec-
tions 2 and 6 of the Railway Labor Act (RLA).92 The court
found that a plant rule, which prohibited the possession or use
of drugs or alcohol on company property and established a
practice of detecting violations by means of the sensory obser-
vations of supervisory personnel, constituted working condi-
tions.93 Thus, the railroad's implementation of a program
utilizing "sniff" dogs was enjoined as a unilateral change in
working conditions violative of the RLA.94
In contrast, the company's implementation of a program
utilizing urinalysis was found to be justified under a safety rule
prohibiting on-duty use or possession of intoxicants.95 The
critical distinction between the two procedures was the fact
that the drug surveillance was to be conducted on a random
basis, whereas the testing was pursued only where there was
cause to believe that the relevant plant rule had been violated.
With respect to section 8(a)(5) violations, the unilateral
implementation of new disciplinary programs has been found
to violate the NLRA.9 6 However, where a collective bargain-
ing agreement contains a broad management rights clause, an
employer's implementation of reasonable plant rules97 is gen-
erally upheld if notice is given to the union in accordance with
the relevant provision in the collective bargaining
agreement. 98
91. Engineers v. Burlington N.R.R., 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3047 (D. Mont. 1985).
92. 45 U.S.C. § 151-188 (1982).
93. The Railroad Labor Act, like the National Labor Relations Act, prohibits an
employer from instituting unilateral changes in working conditions. 45 U.S.C. § 156
(1982).
94. A separate action was filed for declaratory and injunctive relief against Burling-
ton Northern's urine-testing policy. Burlington N.R.R., 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3054 (D.
Mont. 1985).
95. Id. at 3052.
96. See Electri-Flex Co. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 1327 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 911 (1978).
97. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text. But see Faygo Beverages, Inc.,
86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1174 (1986) (Ellman, Arb.).
98. Failure to comply with notice or publication requirements contained in labor
agreement may result in the rule being found invalid. Capital Area Transit Auth., 69
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 811 (1977) (Ellmann, Arb.).
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Where management has retained the prerogative to estab-
lish "reasonable" plant rules, the issue resulting from the
company's implementation of drug or alcohol testing pro-
grams will be subject to arbitration and concern the "reasona-
bleness" of the rule.99  In Boone Energy,"°  an employer,
pursuant to a management rights clause in which the exclu-
sive right to hire and discharge employees was reserved and a
provision which provided that employees are entitled to a safe
working place, instituted a search and random testing pro-
gram. Rejecting the union's contention that the discharge was
improper, the arbitrator not only found the employer's action
reasonable, but stated that since an employee had been found
under the influence of a controlled substance prior to the insti-
tution of the testing "an employer would be remiss if it did not
become suspicious of the entire work force and then take steps
to see if a basic common sense rule was being violated.""1 1
Generally, strong public policy considerations in favor of as-
suring a safe working environment10 2 suggest that testing or
search programs instituted under a managements right clause
should be found reasonable.
B. The Scope of Plant Rules
Unless a plant rule prohibiting the use or possession of
drugs or alcohol is found to be "unreasonable, arbitrary, ca-
pricious, [or] discriminatory,"' 1 3 an arbitrator will ordinarily
enforce a rule which is uniformly applied. °4 Furthermore, in
99. See, e.g., Rust Eng'g Co., 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 407 (1985) (Whyte, Arb.); Shell
Oil Co., 84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 562 (1985) (Milentz, Arb.); Texas Utils. Generating Co.,
82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 6 (1983) (Edes, Arb.).
100. 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 233 (1985) (O'Connell, Arb.).
101. Id. at 236. But see Gem City Chems. Inc., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1023 (1986)
(Warns, Arb.) (implementation of plant rule requiring drug screen during physical ex-
amination not within management rights clause where drug testing conducted without
probable cause).
102. "Being under the influence of drugs or alcohol renders an employee incapable
of performing his work. In the industrial environment, it also renders the employee a
hazard to himself and others." Porcelain Metals Corp., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1133, 1139
(1979) (Roberts, Arb.).
103. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 558, 563 (1984) (Mikrut,
Jr., Arb.).
104. See, e.g., Western Paper Box, 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 917, 921 (1983) (Concep-
cion, Arb.) (equal treatment in enforcing plant rules required). But see Hussmann Re-
frigerator Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 558 (1984) (Mikrut, Jr., Arb.).
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formulating plant rules to protect against the possession or use
of alcohol or drugs, "an employer is not narrowly limited to
denouncing acts already made criminal by the law but may, at
a minimum, adopt reasonable prophylactic measures going
beyond the statutes." ' ° In an assessment of a discharge re-
sulting from the application of plant rules, public policy in
favor of an employer's attempt to protect the safety of em-
ployees by providing a drug-free work place is a factor rele-
vant to the propriety of reinstatement.10 6
Where the scope of a plant rule extends to include off-duty
conduct,10 7 an employee discharged as a result of the enforce-
ment of such a rule may be reinstated with back pay unless the
employer can establish a probable impact at the plant from
the nature of the employee's misconduct.108 For example, the
arbitrator in Kentile Floors, Inc.,1°9 reinstated, with full sen-
iority and back pay, an employee discharged pursuant to a
company policy of discharge where employees had been con-
victed of a crime. The employee had been convicted on a mis-
demeanor charge of possession of a narcotic. While stating
that the discharge would clearly be reasonable had the offense
been committed on company property,' 10 the arbitrator found
that the off-duty offense did not constitute "just cause" be-
cause the offense "had no discernible effect upon the em-
ployer's business or upon his relationship with other
employees."'
105. Misco, Inc. v. Paperworkers, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2119, 2122 (5th Cir.
1985).
106. Id.
107. Even when an employee is on company property, an employer cannot require
the testing of the employee when the employee's presence is unrelated to his employ-
ment. Texas Utils. Generating Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 6, 11 (1983) (Edes, Arb.).
108. Weyerhauser Co., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 182 (1985) (Lewin, Arb.); W.E. Cald-
well Co., 28 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 434 (1957) (Kesselman, Arb.). But see Olson v. Job Serv.
N.D., 379 N.W.2d 285 (N.D. 1985) (employee entitled to unemployment compensation
where discharged for violating written agreement not to consume alcoholic beverages
on or off duty.) Cf Gregory v. Anderson, 19 Wis. 2d. 130, 109 N.W.2d 675 (1961).
109. Kentile Floors, Inc., 57 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 919 (1971) (Block, Arb.).
110. Id. at 921; see also General Portland Cement Co., 58 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1299
(1972) (Marshall, Arb.). In Wisconsin, discharge or refusal to hire because of an arrest
or conviction record constitutes discrimination unless the charge relates to the job.
Wis. STAT. § 111.322 (1983-84).
111. Kentile Floors, Inc., 57 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 922. (the arbitrator refused to
enforce the rule on the grounds that the rule was overbroad).
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However, a conviction involving the "sale," as opposed to
the "use" or "possession" of drugs may justify "just cause"
for dismissal." 2  In Martin-Marietta Aerospace, 1 3 an em-
ployer's decision to discharge an employee was found proper
after it discovered that the employee had been convicted for
the sale of cocaine to an undercover detective off company
premises. Reconciling his decision with the generally recog-
nized rule stated above, the arbitrator distinguished the dis-
charge of a "user" from a "pusher," finding that in the latter
instance the employer's reasonable expectation that the em-
ployee might sell drugs to other employees established just
cause because of the "impact on the Employer's product, its
reputation, employee safety, plant security and production
and discipline." 14
C. Refusal To Take Tests
In order to establish just cause for discharge under a plant
rule prohibiting drug or alcohol use, it is usually necessary to
confirm a suspicion of use by means of a test." 5 Therefore,
where an employee is confronted by management with a sus-
picion that he or she has violated plant rules prohibiting use of
drugs or alcohol, and the employee denies such use and re-
fuses the opportunity to resolve the conflict by undergoing a
test, a discharge would properly be sustained." 6 Although an
employer would be unable to meet its required burden of
proof' 7  where an employee refuses a test, arbitrators will
112. Martin-Marietta Aerospace, 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 695 (1983) (Aronin, Arb.).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 699.
115. Owens-Coming Fiberglass, 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1026 (Nichols, Jr., Arb.)
(company failed to prove that employee had violated plant rule prohibiting use of drugs
where company relied primarily upon testimony of former employee and another wit-
ness who "smelled" the grievant smoking marijuana). General Tel. Co. of Ind., Inc., 85
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 251, 255-56 (1985) (Winton, Arb.) (where employee handbook pro-
hibited work while "under the influence" of alcohol, testimony that discharged em-
ployee smelled of alcohol and appeared unsteady was insufficient to establish just cause
without breathalyzer test); see also General Tel. Co. of Cal., 60 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1236
(1973) (Levanthal, Arb.) ("The employer's safest course of action under most circum-
stances is to obtain competent medical verification when an employee's condition is
suspect.").
116. General Tel. Co. of Cal., 60 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 1239.
117. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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take into consideration why the requisite proof was not
obtained:
To do otherwise would be to invite employees when alerted
they are under suspicion of reporting to work under the in-
fluence to simply absent themselves so no definitive determi-
nation could be made, then utilize a defense that the
employer cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt they had
in fact been drinking. 118
A different result may be found in Faygo Beverages, Inc. 119
The policy in dispute in Faygo provided that a refusal to take
a test constituted proof of violation of a rule against being in-
toxicated on the job. The arbitrator construed this policy to
be a "palpable reversal of normal just cause principles" and as
such refused to enforce the policy which had neither been ne-
gotiated with the union nor circulated to employees. 2
An alternative approach to that set forth above is to find
that the refusal to take a test is an act of insubordination
which independently warrants discharge. The insubordina-
tion rationale was adopted by the arbitrator in American Stan-
dard,"'1 in which an employee suspected of being under the
influence of drugs repeatedly refused to take a drug test. The
arbitrator found that the employee's refusal to undergo the
drug screen test constituted a direct act of insubordination
punishable under the company rules by discharge. 22
118. General Tel. Co. of Cal., 60 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 1239; see also General Port-
land Cement Co., 58 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1299, 1301 (1972) (Marshall, Arb.) (arbitrator
found the fact that an employee, suspected of possessing illicit substances, refused to
empty pockets to constitute an indirect indication of guilt).
119. 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1174 (1986) (Ellmann, Arb.).
120. Id. at 1177.
121. American Standard, 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1085, 1087-88 (1981) (Katz, Arb.).
122. The right to require employees to submit to testing was found to be reserved in
the collective bargaining agreement which provided that the company could require a
medical examination at any time during employment to determine if the employee was
fit for employment. Id. at 1087.
In American Standard, the discharge for insubordination was supported by the arbi-
trator's finding there was evidence to support the conclusion that the employee was
intoxicated; however, in those instances where a collective bargaining contract directly
provides that a refusal to submit to a test or search is insubordination which will justify
discharge, a claim that there is insufficient proof of an employee's use is irrelevant to the
distinguishable claim of insubordination. Texas Utils. Generating Co., 82 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 6, 11 (1983) (Edes, Arb.).
See also Shell Oil Co., 84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 562 (1985) (Milentz, Arb.) (as inAmeri-
can Standard, there was no insubordination clause directly applicable to refusals to
1986]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Recently, however, the arbitrator in Signal Delivery Ser-
vice, Inc., 12 3 refused to uphold a discharge for insubordination
where an employee refused to take a blood alcohol test. Cen-
tral to the arbitrator's finding was that the employer failed to
establish that the employee was forewarned that his refusal to
submit to the testing would result in discharge. 124
IV. HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION
Both with respect to pre-employment drug screening and
appropriate action to be taken in the event that an employee is
discovered to have reported to work under the influence of an
intoxicant or narcotic, an employer must consider the statu-
tory constraints regarding handicap discrimination.
A. The Rehabilitation Act
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973125 applies generally to fed-
eral employees, 126 federal contractors 127 and to recipients of
comply with searches, and similarly, the broad insubordination clause was extended to
cover the refusal to submit to the search request).
123. 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 75 (1985) (Wies, Arb.).
124. In determining whether the discharge for refusal to submit to the blood alco-
hol test was for just cause, the arbitrator applied the test for just cause set forth in Grief
Bros. Cooperage Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 555 (1964) (Daugherty, Arb.):
1. Did the employee have forewarning of the consequences of his conduct?
2. Was the Company's rule or order related to orderly, efficient and safe
operation?
3. Before imposing discipline, did the Company make an effort to discover
whether the employee violated the rule?
4. Was Management's investigation conducted fairly and objectively?
5. Did the investigation reveal substantial proof or evidence that the employee
was guilty?
6. Has Management applied the rules evenhandedly and without
discrimination?
7. Was the degree of discipline reasonably related to the seriousness of the of-
fense and the employee's past record?
Signal Delivery, 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 80-81.
125. 29 U.S.C. § 701-796 (1982).
126. 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (1982).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1982) ("the party contracting with the United States shall
take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped
individuals"); see also DEPT. OF LABOR, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE HANDI-
CAPPED: A HANDBOOK FOR EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY SPECIALISTS AT THE OF-
FICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (1980).
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federal funds.128 The legislative history of the Rehabilitation
Act indicates that it was enacted to "promote and expand em-
ployment opportunities in the public and private sectors for
handicapped individuals." 129 However, for the purpose of sec-
tions 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which pertain
respectively to federal contractors and recipients of federal
funds, 130 an individual is not handicapped where drug or alco-
hol use "prevents such individual from performing the duties
of the job in question or whose employment, by reason of such
current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat
to property or the safety of others."' 131 In contrast, under sec-
tion 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, affirmative action required
of federal employers is not so contrained. 132  Specifically,
where a federal employee's alcohol or drug abuse prevents the
individual from properly performing his or her job, a federal
agency has a duty to "make reasonable accommodations...
unless the accommodation would impose an undue hardship
on the operation of its program."' 133
In 'Whitlock v. Donovan,1 34 the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia recently addressed the is-
sue of the scope of a federal agency's duty "to accommo-
date." 135  The alcohol-related difficulties of the employee in
Whitlock commenced with an alcoholic seizure on the job re-
128. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) ("[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual...
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefit of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance .... ").
129. S. REP. No. 93-318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076.
130. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
131. Id. Section 706(7) was intended to "exclude alcoholics and drug abusers in
need of rehabilitation from the definition of'handicapped individual."' H.R. REP. No.
95-1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
7312, 7333.
132. The definitional limitation under § 706(7)(B) applies only to Rehabilitation
Act § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 793, and Rehabilittion Act § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 791(b), 794(a) (1982). For a distinction of Rehabilitation Act § 501, 29 U.S.C.
§ 791, which applies to federal employees, from Rehabilitation Act §§ 503 and 504, 29
U.S.C. §§ 793, 794, which cover federal contractors and recipients of federal aid respec-
tively, see Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271, 1277 (8th Cir. 1985); Whitlock v. Dono-
van, 598 F. Supp. 126, 129 (D.D.C. 1984).
133. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(a) (1985).
134. 598 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1984).
135. The standard of the duty to "accommodate" was based largely on publications
of the United States Office of Personnel Management. Id. at 131-33 (quoting UNITED
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quiring hospitalization and continued for the next five years
with a series of unauthorized absences which finally
culminated in discharge.
Since the employee's handicap was alcohol dependency, 136
in addition to the section 501 protection, the employee was
covered under the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alco-
holism Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act of 1970
("Act"). 137 The Act prohibits federal employers from denying
or depriving employment "solely138 on the ground of prior al-
cohol abuse or prior alcoholism"' 139 and includes a provision
that the section "shall not be construed to prohibit the dismis-
sal from employment of a federal civilian employee who can-
not properly function in his employment."'" Despite the
similarity of the language of the provision to section
706(7)(B), 14 a which has been construed to exclude alcohol and
drug abusers whose use prevents them from performing their
work, the court held that the Act indicated that "dismissal
was intended only to apply to employees who refused treat-
ment altogether or who had repeatedly failed in treatment."' 142
Viewing the statutes together, the court found "a firm inten-
tion to require federal employers to exert substantial affirma-
tive efforts to assist alcoholic employees toward overcoming
their handicap before firing them for performance deficiencies
related to drinking."'143
The district court's holding that the Labor Department
had failed to "reasonably accommodate" the employee was
predicated upon the following analysis of the statutory and
regulatory rehabilitation requirements:
STATES OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL SYS-
TEM SUPPLEMENT 792-2, ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE PROGRAMS (1980)).
136. Alcoholism is a handicap covered under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 598
F. Supp. at 129 (citing 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 12 (1977)).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd, as amended by Act of Oct. 19, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-509.
138. For a discussion of the interpretation to be given to the word "solely," see
Walker v. Weinberger, 600 F. Supp. 757 (D.D.C. 1985). The court held that an alco-
holic is to be removed "solely" on the basis of unsatisfactory performance or after re-
fusal of treatment. Id. at 761.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-l(c) (Supp. III 1985).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-l(d) (Supp. III 1985).
141. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
142. Whitlock, 598 F. Supp. at 131.
143. Id. (emphasis added).
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[W]hen an employee's deficiencies are suspected to be due to
alcohol, the agency is first required to offer counseling. If
the employee rebuffs the offer, and if his work is such that
discipline would be warranted, the agency should offer a
"firm choice" between treatment and discipline. An agency
is required to follow through on its firm offers. 1"
In the case at instance, the court found that "reasonable ac-
commodation" required (1) an evaluation of all available evi-
dence to determine if deficiencies in employment were related
to alcohol, 145 and (2) a firm choice between serious discipli-
nary action and an offer of extended leave without pay for
inpatient treatment.1 46  In addition, the court recently in
Walker v. Weinberger 47 further defined the scope of "reason-
able accommodation" to include "forgiveness of [the em-
ployee's] past alcohol-induced misconduct in proportion to his
willingness to undergo and favorable response to treat-
ment." 148 Thus, where an employee has undergone rehabilita-
tion, those acts related to the employee's pre-treatment
alcohol-induced behavior may not be cumulated with non-al-
cohol-related misconduct in an assessment of disciplinary
action. 149
Despite the breadth of a federal employer's duty to accom-
modate, the Rehabilitation Act does not require the provision
of "help indefinitely to an employee who [can]not safely or
adequately perform his job." 15° For example, in Robinson v.
144. Id. at 133-34.
145. Where there is no nexus between alcoholism and the acts or reasons justifying
discharge, there is no violation under the Act for failure to accommodate. Richardson
v. United States Postal Serv., No. 84-3648 (D.D.C. July 29, 1985) discussed in DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 156, at A-10 (Aug. 13, 1985).
146. The court qualified its holding as follows:
[T]his is not to say that in every instance where an agency confronts an alcoholic
employee who has failed in treatment that it must offer leave without pay or
some other specific arrangement. But if there is evidence ... that such a leave
might have been beneficial, the reasonable accommodation duty requires the
agency to evaluate whether such a leave, or alternative arrangement, would have
imposed an undue hardship on the agency.
Whitlock, 598 F. Supp. at 137.
147. 600 F. Supp. 757 (D.D.C. 1985).
148. Id. at 762. But see Spragg v. Campbell, 466 F. Supp. 658 (D.S.D. 1979) (the
court held 42 U.S.C. § 4561, renumbered as 42 U.S.C. § 290dd (Supp. III 1985) only to
prohibit the removal of an employee solely because of alcohol abuse).
149. Walker, 600 F. Supp. at 762.
150. Robinson v. Devine, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 728, 731 (D.D.C. 1985).
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Devine,"' a federal employee's claim of handicap discrimina-
tion was rejected where the employee refused counseling after
repeated efforts to accommodate the employee's alcoholism
had failed. Since the employee refused counseling after a
"firm choice" of counseling prior to discharge, the employer
was found to have met the duty to accommodate. 152 More-
over, it should be noted that the duty to accommodate does
not require an employer to reassign an employee to a job
which could be performed with the handicap. 153 Therefore, in
the event that an alcohol- or drug-dependent employee refuses
or repeatedly fails at efforts of rehabilitation, an employer
would not be required to reassign the employee to a job less
hazardous or strenuous which could arguably be performed
despite the addiction.
The standards set forth in Whitlock should apply equally
in the case of accommodating drug abusers, although such in-
dividuals are not afforded the additional protection of section
290dd.154 Both former addicts and employees suffering from
drug addiction are considered handicapped if the addiction
"substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
activities ....
In McCleod v. City of Detroit,1 56 applicants for firefighter
jobs were rejected after a drug screening test indicated the re-
cent use of marijuana. The applicants claimed they had been
discriminated against in violation of section 794 of Title 29 of
the United Ststes Code. 15 7 Since the challenged discrimina-
tion was made with respect to a federally funded program, as
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Carty v. Carlin, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1217, 1222 (D. Md. 1985);
see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79-83 (accommodation
does not require an employer to violate seniority provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement).
154. See supra note 124 (the Federal Personnel Manuals which provided a basis for
the Court's decision apply to both alcoholics and drug abusers).
155. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)(i) (1982); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(a) (1986).
'Major life activities' means functions, such as caring for one's self, performing man-
ual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29
C.F.R. § 1613.702(c) (1986); 42 FED. REG. 22686 (1977) (Op. Secretary, Department of
Health, Education and Welfare) (drug addiction is a physical or mental impairment
within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act).
156. 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 225 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
157. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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opposed to a federal agency, the city would be justified in de-
nying employment if it were established that the use of mari-
juana adversely affected a firefighter's ability to perform.'58
Thus, the court's dismissal of the applicants' claims was predi-
cated upon two grounds: (1) the use of marijuana did not con-
stitute an impairment within the meaning of the
Rehabilitation Act;159 and (2) even if marijuana use were a
protected handicap, the criteria of denying employment for
use was required by job necessity and therefore protected. 160
Under the second ground, the city would have met its burden
even if marijuana use were deemed to be a handicap under the
Act. However, it is significant to note that the marijuana use
was not found to constitute a handicap on the basis of its in-
terference with the applicants' ability to be firefighters: "[o]ne
particular job for one particular employer cannot be a major
life activity."'161
While the selection criteria in McCleod were found to be
protected,162 in Davis v. Bucher 6 3 the criteria used were held
to violate the Rehabilitation Act. In Bucher, the city's screen-
ing procedures revealed methadone in the urine of an appli-
cant. As a result of the test, the applicant was denied
employment.164 The drug usage in this case was an addiction
clearly within the Rehabilitation Act;165 therefore, the burden
was upon the employer to establish the disqualification of for-
mer addicts as a criterion related to the applicant's ability to
perform. The disqualification was found violative of the Re-
habilitation Act since the sole criterion of exclusion was for-
mer drug abuse and such abuse was not shown to affect
successful employment.166 Thus, while a federal contractor or
recipient of federal aid may discharge or refuse to hire an em-
ployee for reasons relating to drug or alcohol impairment
158. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
159. McCleod, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 227-28.
160. Id. at 228.
161. Id. (quoting Salt Lake City Corp. v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632, 636 (Utah 1983)).
See generally M. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL SCREENING OF WORKERS 121-30 (1984).
162. See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.706 (1986).
163. 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
164. Two intervening plaintiffs had similarly been denied employment on the basis
of former drug usage. Id. at 794.
165. Id. at 795.
166. Id. at 796-97.
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without violating the Rehabilitation Act, the employer must
establish a relationship between the ability to perform a job
efficiently or safely and the employee's substance use. How-
ever, despite the fact that alcoholism or drug addiction affects
an employee's ability to perform a job efficiently or safely, a
federal employer may discharge an employee only after a
"firm choice" between rehabilitation and discipline is
presented.
B. Wisconsin Fair Employment Act
In a manner similar to the Federal Act, section
111.34(2)(a) of the Wisconsin Statutes 167 prohibits discrimina-
tion on the basis of a handicap, but provides that "it is not
employment discrimination because of handicap to refuse to
hire, employ, admit or license any individual.., if the handi-
cap is reasonably related to the individual's ability to ade-
quately undertake the job-related responsibilities of that
individual's employment, membership or licensure."1 68 In ad-
dition, the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (WEA) provides
for a duty to accommodate 169 which largely parallels the fed-
eral regulatory provisions discussed above. 171
It is undisputed that alcoholism is a handicap under the
Wisconsin Act.171 While the Wisconsin courts have not yet
determined whether drug abuse constitutes a handicap, it
seems probable that a medically diagnosed 172 addiction would
fall within the statutory definition. 173 Although drug im-
paired employees are within the scope of the accommodation
167. WIs. STAT. § 111.34(2)(a) (1983-84).
168. Id.
169. WIS. STAT. § 111.34(1)(b) (1983-84).
170. See supra note 132.
171. See Squires v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 97 Wis. 2d 648, 294 N.W.2d
48 (1980). See also Comment, Hidden Handicaps: Protection of Alcoholics, Drug Ad-
dicts, and the Mentally Ill Against Employment Discrimination Under the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 and the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 725, 732-35.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio cited Squires in its holding that drug addiction
and alcoholism constitute handicaps under the state handicap discrimination law. Ha-
zlett v. Martin Chevrolet, Inc., reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 174, at D-1
(Aug. 13, 1986).
172. See, e.g., Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor &
Human Relations, 86 Wis. 2d 393, 407-08, 273 N.W.2d 206, 213 (1979).
173. WiS. STAT. § 111.32(8) (1983-84).
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provision of the Wisconsin Statutes, the precise scope of the
accomodation is as yet undetermined.
Decisions rendered with respect to alcoholism were con-
sidered prior to the 1982 amendments to the Act. 174 Thus, for
example, in Squires v. Labor & Industry Review Commis-
sion,175 the court found that the discharge of an alcoholic did
not constitute discrimination because "[n]othing . . . in sec.
11 1.32(5)(f), Stats., prevents an employer from discharging an
employee who is an alcoholic and who because of his alcohol-
ism is physically or otherwise unable to efficiently perform the
duties required in his job."1 76 While WEA, as amended, still
provides that a decision not to hire or to discharge is not dis-
crimination where reasonably related to the job criteria, an
employer under section 11 1.34(1)(b) 177 might now be required
to accommodate an alcoholic employee otherwise qualified for
the particular job. Given the substantial similarity of WEA to
the Rehabilitation Act and the fact that federal law has previ-
ously been used in interpreting Wisconsin discrimination
law,178 it is likely that rehabilitation under WEA will assume
the standards set forth under the Rehabilitation Act.179
Finally, sections 111.34(2)(a) and (b)1 0 appear to have ab-
rogated the previous "rational relationship" and "reasonable
174. See, e.g., Squires, 97 Wis. 2d 648, 294 N.W.2d 48; Connecticut Gen. Life, 86
Wis. 2d 393, 273 N.W.2d 206.
175. 97 Wis. 2d 648, 294 N.W.2d 48.
176. Id. at 652, 273 N.W.2d at 51.
177. Wis. STAT. § 111.32(5)(f) (1983-84) provides:
The prohibition against discrimination because of handicap does not apply to
failure of an employer to employ or to retain as an employe any person who
because of a handicap is physically or otherwise unable to efficiently perform, at
the standards set by the employer, the duties required in that job.
Id.
Wis. STAT. § 11l.34(l)(b) provides that handicap discrimination includes
"[r]efusing to reasonably accommodate an employe's or prospective employe's handicap
unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would pose a hardship on
the employer's program, enterprise or business."
178. See, e.g., Samens v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 117 Wis. 2d 646, 345
N.W.2d 432 (1984); Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Rela-
tions, 90 Wis. 2d 408, 280 N.W.2d 142 (1979).
179. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
180. Wis. STAT. § 11 1.34(2)(a) and (b) provides in relevant part:
[It] is not employment discrimination to refuse to hire, [or] employ ... if the
handicap is reasonably related to the individual's ability to adequately undertake
the job-related responsibilities of that individual's employment.... (b) In evalu-
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probability of hazard" distinctions used to determine safety-
based hiring standards under WEA prior to the 1982 amend-
ments. In Samens v. Labor & Industry Review Commission,"'
the court, applying the unamended statute, found an em-
ployer's refusal to hire an epileptic as a truck driver/
groundman to be legitimate under the exception of the statute.
The employer had "outright" rejected the applicant after
learning of his condition and prior to requesting any medical
records. Despite the absence of any individual evaluation, the
court nevertheless held the employer's refusal to hire legiti-
mate by finding that the particular nature of the job justified
the application of the lower standard requiring only a "ra-
tional relationship" between the criteria and its safety obliga-
tions. While the outcome under the Wisconsin Statute as
amended might be the same, the WEA now clearly requires a
"reasonable" relationship of an employment criterion to a de-
cision not to hire or employ on the basis of a handicap, and
the evaluation of the "reasonable" relationship must be made
on an individual, case-by-case basis.
V. SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Despite contractual and statutory constraints on an em-
ployer's use and application of drug and alcohol testing, pub-
lic policy mandates the adoption of means to detect
chemically impaired employees.' 82 In addition to the inherent
cost of worker's compensation associated with the employ-
ment of an alcohol or drug abusive employee,1 8 3 failure to
ating whether a handicapped individual can adequately undertake the job-related
responsibilities of a particular job, membership or licensed activity, the present
and future safety of the individual, of the individual's coworkers and, if applica-
ble, of the general public may be considered. However, this evaluation shall be
made on an individual case-by-case basis and may not be made by a general rule
which prohibits the employment or licensure of handicapped individuals in gen-
eral or a particular class of handicapped individuals.
181. 117 Wis. 2d 646, 345 N.W.2d 432 (1984).
182. See, e.g., Misco, Inc. v. Paperworkers, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2119 (5th Cir.
1985).
183. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 102.58 (1983-84) (where injury results from an em-
ployee's intoxication, reduction in worker's compensation is limited to $15,000); see also
District 141, Int'l. Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Industrial Comm'n,
79 Ill. 2d 544, 404 N.E.2d 787 (1980) (in order for employee's intoxication to bar
worker's compensation claim, the intoxication must incapacitate the employee in per-
forming his job-related duties); Karns v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 275 Md. 1, 338 A.2d
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adopt programs to detect and effectively deal with alcohol- or
drug-dependent employees may result in numerous other
claims.18 4
The statutorily-imposed duties to furnish a safe place of
employment to employees and frequenters have not yet been
the subject of employer liability in the context of the employ-
ment of drug-impaired employees. However, the potential ap-
plication of such statutes was recently made apparent in a
federal district court opinion.18 5  In its decision, the court
found that an employer's disclosure of an employee's mental
condition was justified, in part, by the fact that the employer
presented a dangerous condition in its work place within the
meaning of West Virginia's safe-place statute.'16 It is evident
that if other jurisdictions should find an employee's dangerous
condition to be within an employer's duty to provide a safe
place of employment, the employment of alcoholics or drug
addicts could result in substantial liability.
In addition, potential liability may exist under the com-
mon law duty to control the actions of a person known to be
dangerous.1 87  A court applied the common law negligence
doctrine in Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark ' and held an em-
251 (1975) (to bar worker's compensation claim, injury must arise "solely" from intoxi-
cation); Driscoll v. Great Plains Mktg. Co., 322 N.W.2d 478 (S.D. 1982) (claim is
barred where injury is proximately caused by intoxication). An employer's acquies-
cence may bar an employer from asserting an intoxication defense. See, eg., McCarty
v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 12 Cal. 3d 677, 527 P.2d 617, 117 Cal. Rptr.
65 (1979); West Fla. Distribs. v. Lamarie, 438 So. 2d 133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 1983).
184. See generally Obdyke, Employee Intoxication and Employers' Liability, PER-
SONNEL ADMINISTRATOR 109 (Feb. 1986).
185. Davis v. Monsanto Co., No. 84-2493 (D. W. Va. 1985) reprinted in DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 30, at D-1 (Feb. 13, 1985).
186. West Virginia's "safe-place" statute, W. VA. CODE, § 21-3-1, (1985) is identi-
cal in relevant part to Wis. STAT. § 101.11(1) (1983-84). But see Korenak v. Curative
Workshop Adult Rehabilitation Center, 71 Wis. 2d 77, 237 N.W.2d 43 (1976); Gross v.
Dennow, 61 Wis. 2d 40, 212 N.W.2d 2 (1973) (vis. STAT. § 101.11(1) applies only to
unsafe physical conditions). Cf. Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor &
Human Relations, 90 Wis. 2d 408, 421, n.5, 280 N.W.2d 142, 148 n.5 (WIs. STAT.
§ 101.11(1) cited with respect to a handicapped employee's ability to perform safely).
187. One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be
likely to cause bodily harm to others if not contolled is under a duty to exercise reason-
able care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1977).
188. 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1983); see also Beckendorf v. Simmons, 539 S.W.2d 31
(Tenn. 1976) (employer liable to third person injured as a result of an intoxicated off-
duty employee's collision.).
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ployer liable in a wrongful death action where an employee
had become involved in an accident after being dismissed
from work in an intoxicated state. Under an alternative negli-
gence doctrine, the employer could potentially be held respon-
sible for the tortious acts committed by a known drug or
alcohol abuser for failing to exercise reasonable care to control
the conduct of the employee while on the business premises.I 9
VI. CONCLUSION
Where employees report to work under the influence of
alcohol or narcotics, an employer's increased susceptibility to
liability is apparent. As a result, increasing numbers of em-
ployers are instituting drug detection programs.' 90 Ideally,
these programs will include benefits for the coverage of treat-
ment for chemical dependency' 91 or employee assistance pro-
grams which provide rehabilitation services. 192
Although public employers may, in most instances, be re-
quired to have a "reasonable suspicion" of use or possession
prior to testing an employee for substance impairment, private
employers are not subject to the fourth amendment restric-
tions upon random searches. If a common law right to pri-
vacy were found to exist with respect to employee searches,
private employers might be restrained against the adoption of
random testing programs; however, the extension of this doc-
trine to employment relations remains uncertain. Similarly,
recent arbitration decisions recognizing the public policy in-
herent in an employer's efforts to provide a drug-free work
place indicate that employers who are parties to collective bar-
gaining agreements may implement and apply reasonable
drug and alcohol detecton programs.
Handicap discrimination laws may impose restraints upon
the course of action to be taken upon discovery of intoxication
189. See Korenak, 71 Wis. 2d 77 at 82-83, 237 N.W.2d at 46-47 (citing RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319).
190. See supra note 4.
191. See, e.g., From Baseball Diamond to Shop Floor Employers, Battling Alcohol!
Drug Abuse, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 211, at C-1 (Oct. 31, 1985); see also Wis.
STAT. § 632.89 (1983-84) (requires coverage for treatment of alcohol and drug abuse
problems).
192. See, e.g., Conference Takes Close Look at Substance Abuse in Workplace,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 218, at A-2 (Nov. 10, 1985).
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or drug abuse. However, where affirmative action is required,
the employer is nevertheless assured, by presenting to the em-
ployee a "firm choice" of discipline or rehabilitative measures,
that the drug-impaired employee will be removed and will
hopefully return to employment in a rehabilitated state.
JENNIFER L. ADAMS
